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Introduction
With the emergence of many cutting-edge technologies, we are often
promised radical and unsubstantiated benefits. These benefits may include
anything from sunscreens with smoother application to innovative
methods for delivering medications throughout the body.1 With
nanotechnology, a wide range of common products have been improved
in function, cost effectiveness, or both.2 Nanotechnology is currently used
in products Americans use daily: food, appliances, sunscreen, medication,
clothing, and cosmetics. This present application of nanotechnology to
enhance our everyday lives shows just how much promise nanotechnology
holds for the future.
Nevertheless, nanotechnology may also present new risks. Scientists
are not sure whether nanotechnology poses any serious health hazards to
humans or the environment. Considering our wide exposure to nanotechnology, it is critical that we identify potential risks and impose
regulations that strike a balance between accessing the benefits of
nanotechnology and limiting the foreseeable harm to the environment
and public health.
Nanotechnology is the manipulation of matter on an atomic scale to
create tiny, functional structures.3 These structures are incredibly small:
one nanometer is precisely one-billionth of a meter.4 Nanotechnology is
defined as the production of materials that are between one and onehundred nanometers in size.5 Although they cannot be seen with the
naked eye, these microscopic structures called “nanoparticles” have been
proven to benefit humans in a variety of ways. For example, they can
lead to new medical treatments.6 They also can be used to develop
1.

Some Examples of How Nanotechnology Impacts Our Lives Now,
NANOTECHNOLOGY NOW, http://www.nanotech-now.com/current-uses.htm
(last updated May 22, 2012, 9:56 PM); Researchers Create DNA Buckyballs
for Drug Delivery, PHYSORG (Aug. 29, 2005), http://www.physorg.com/
news6066.html

2.

NANOTECHNOLOGY NOW, supra note 1.

3.

Extramural Research: Nanotechnology, EPA, http://epa.gov/ncer/nano/
questions/index.html (last updated Mar. 22, 2011).

4.

David Bradley, Measuring Up Size Comparisons, SCIENCEBASE (June 7,
2007, 4:00 PM), http://www.sciencebase.com/science-blog/measuring-upsize-comparisons.html.

5.

MARK RATNER & DANIEL RATNER, NANOTECHNOLOGY: A GENTLE
INTRODUCTION TO THE NEXT BIG IDEA 7 (Michelle Vincenti ed., 2003); see
A. Elder et al., Human Health Risks of Engineered Nanomaterials, in
NANOMATERIALS: RISKS AND BENEFITS 3, 5 (Igor Linkov & Jeffery Steevens
eds., 2009).

6.

See, e.g., Elizabeth Bahm, Fullerene Finding Shows Possibilities and Dangers
of Nanotechnology (Apr. 8, 2010), http://news.medill.northwestern.edu/
chicago/news.aspx?id=162744.
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building materials with a very high strength-to-weight ratio.7 Sunscreen
and cosmetics that make use of nanoparticles apply more smoothly and
evenly to human skin.8 Other examples of products that utilize
nanoparticles include stain-resistant clothing, lightweight golf clubs,
bicycles, car bumpers, antimicrobial wound dressings, and synthetic
bones.9
While there are many benefits presented by nanotechnology, there
are also potential risks. Studies have indicated that nanoparticles called
carbon nanotubes act like asbestos within the human body.10 Cells that
are exposed to nanostructures called “buckyballs”11 have been shown to
undergo slowed or even halted cell division.12 In general, the small size
and high surface-area-to-volume ratio of nanoparticles indicates a higher
potential for toxicity.13
The application of nanotechnology to drug development has aided
the treatment of common life-threatening diseases while concurrently
posing toxic side effects.14 For example, carbon nanotubes15 may be used
to enhance cancer treatments, but there is also an indication that the
nanotubes themselves might ironically have a carcinogenic effect on the
human body.16 Certain nanoparticles can be used to enhance water
filtration systems, but there are concerns that the production of
nanoscale products may lead to new types of water pollution.17 Common
7.

Min-Feng Yu et al., Strength and Breaking Mechanism of Multiwalled
Carbon Nanotubes Under Tensile Load, 287 SCIENCE 637, 637 (2000).

8.

NANOTECHNOLOGY NOW, supra note 1.

9.

Id.; Vivian S.W. Chan, Nanomedicine: An Unresolved Regulatory Issue, 46
REG. TOXICOLOGY & PHARMACOLOGY 218, 220 (2006).

10.

See infra Part I.C.

11.

See infra Part I.C.

12.

See infra Part I.C.

13.

GEORGIA MILLER, NANOMATERIALS, SUNSCREENS AND COSMETICS: SMALL
INGREDIENTS BIG RISKS 6 (May 2006), available at http://nano.foe.org.au/
sites/default/files/FoEA%20nano%20cosmetics%20report%202MB.pdf.
(“There is a general relationship between particle size and toxicity; the
smaller a particle, the greater its surface area to volume ratio, and the
more likely it is to prove toxic.”).

14.

Nanotubes
and
their
Applications,
UNDERSTANDINGNANO.COM,
http://www.understandingnano.com/nanotubes-carbon.html (last visited
May 12, 2013).

15.

Carbon nanotubes are a tube-like nanoscale structure made from carbon
that are very strong and very lightweight and have been found to have
many uses, from medical treatments to enhancing building materials. See
id.

16.

See infra Part I.C.

17.

David Grimshaw, Nanotechnology for Clean Water: Facts and Figures,
SCIDEV.NET (May 6, 2009), http://www.scidev.net/en/agriculture-and-
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to these examples is the difficulty in determining whether the benefits of
nanotechnology will outweigh the risks.
One place to turn for answers is the regulatory agency tasked with
investigating the risks posed by nanotechnology. The Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) has the regulatory authority to assess the
environmental and public health risks associated with nanotechnology,
and to prescribe regulations as needed to prevent or reduce those risks.18
Unfortunately, authority to assess those risks does not mean the EPA
has adequate tools to do so.19 Nanotechnology is becoming ubiquitous as
the industry continues to expand, and new products are being created
every day.20 The need for thorough risk assessment, followed by
appropriate risk management, is becoming more important as potential
environmental and public exposure to nanoparticles is becoming more
common.21
Nanotechnology is not categorically dangerous.22 The current danger
is that it is unknown whether nanoparticles present any risks to the
environment and public health. As more common household products are
created or enhanced with nanoparticles, public exposure to nanotechnology
is increasing rapidly.23 This increasing public exposure indicates an urgent
need for risk assessment. And as exposure increases, it becomes more
important that the EPA be able to determine what risks will accompany
that exposure, if any, so that it can properly balance the risks against
the benefits and promulgate the most effective rules.
Generally speaking, the EPA is familiar with assessing risks and
regulating new products. The EPA has authority through the Toxic
Substances Control Act (TSCA) to regulate chemical manufacturing.24
TSCA requires manufacturers to inform the EPA of the potential risks
associated with a new product, or new uses for an existing product,
before production begins.25 This gives the EPA an opportunity to
prohibit or limit the manufacturing of that substance.26 While this seems
environment/land-water-pollution/features/nanotechnology-for-cleanwater-facts-and-figures.html.
18.

See 15 U.S.C. § 2601 (2011).

19.

J. CLARENCE DAVIES, EPA AND NANOTECHNOLOGY: OVERSIGHT FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY 24 (2007), available at http://www.nanotechproject.org/process/
assets/files/2698/197_nanoepa_pen9.pdf [hereinafter DAVIES 1].

20.

See id. at 13.

21.

Id.

22.

Id. at 13–14.

23.

Id.

24.

15 U.S.C. § 2601 (2011).

25.

Id. § 2601(b)(1).

26.

Id. § 2601(b)(2).
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to suggest that the EPA is well-equipped to manage the potential risks
of products containing nanoparticles, some say that TSCA is outdated
and that it will be difficult to use this older statute to regulate modern
technology.27
Part I of this Note provides background on nanotechnology, including
what it is, how it can be useful, and risks it may present. Part II discusses
the potential use of TSCA to assess the risks associated with new
technologies and the challenges that may arise in trying to apply TSCA
to nanotechnology.28 Part III proposes alternatives to using current EPA
regulations to regulate nanotechnology. These alternatives include selfregulation, agency regulation through a newly proposed agency, and a
way to combine the benefits of these proposals while eliminating the
weaknesses through the use of co-regulation and the creation of a
Nanotech Division within each key agency associated with nanotechnology.

I. What is Nanotechnology?
Nanotechnology is the creation of functional structures with at least
one dimension that measures between one and one hundred nanometers.29
To illustrate how small this is, a human hair is approximately 100,000
nanometers wide.30 Comparing a nanometer to a meter is equivalent to
comparing the size of a marble to the size of the Earth.31 When an
element or molecule is manufactured on the nanoscale, it may have
different physical and chemical properties than those found in the same
element or molecule manufactured on a large scale.32 If a one-inch cube
of gold is cut into four equal pieces, each of those pieces will retain the
physical and chemical properties of the original cube of gold—including
melting point, boiling point, color, etc. This will remain true as you
continue cutting the gold into smaller and smaller pieces, even when the
pieces are too small to be seen with the naked eye. But once those pieces
27.

See J. CLARENCE DAVIES, OVERSIGHT OF NEXT GENERATION
NANOTECHNOLOGY 23-24 (2009), available at http://www.nanotechproject.org/
process/assets/files/7316/pen-18.pdf [hereinafter DAVIES 2].

28.

It is important to keep in mind that while the EPA is involved with a wide
range of environmental concerns, from product development to waste
disposal, the scope of this Note is focused on regulating nanotechnology at
the earliest stages of development, production, manufacturing and
marketing to consumers.

29.

Andre Nel et al., Toxic Potential of Materials at the Nanolevel, 311
SCIENCE 622, 622 (2006).

30.

How Big is a Nanometer?!, NANOSCIENCE KITS (Jan. 20, 2010, 2:02 PM),
http://www.nanosciencekits.org/how-big-is-a-nanometer.

31.

Christopher J. Chetsanga, Professor, Univ. of Zimbabwe, Presentation at
Breakout Session on Nanotechnology in Health Sciences (Nov. 4–6, 2009)
(on file with author).

32.

See RATNER & RATNER, supra note 5, at 12.
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are so small that they enter the nanoscale, those physical and chemical
properties may change.33
The manufacture of nanoscale materials, or nanofabrication, can
occur in one of two ways. Top-down nanofabrication is when a large
item is cut down to the nanoscale.34 Bottom-up nanofabrication is when
individual atoms are assembled to create a nanostructure.35 Both types
of nanofabrication produce nanoparticles exhibiting new chemical or
physical properties or both. This can lead to a variety of new products
and enhancement of existing products. One element in particular,
carbon, has been found to be very useful on the nanoscale. Carbon
nanotubes are known for being extremely lightweight and extremely
strong, having the highest tensile strength36 of any material tested.37
A.

The Unsuspecting Consumer of Nanomaterials

Most consumers are unaware or unconcerned that many common
products they use contain nanoscale materials, including food, sunscreen,
hair straighteners, clothing, computer hardware, bicycles, wound
dressings, air sanitizing spray, health supplements, bricks, toothpaste,
baby products, and automotive lubricants.38 Non-profit consumer safety
groups have voiced concerns regarding consumers being unknowingly
exposed to nanomaterials through the application of sunscreen or the
foods they eat.39 While these non-profit consumer safety groups have
begun to take action, surveys have shown that the public may not be
concerned with the risks associated with nanotechnology.40 A 2011
survey showed that consumers ranked the risks associated with
nanotechnology fairly low when compared to other health risks.41
33.

Id.

34.

Id.

35.

Id.

36.

Tensile strength is the “force required to pull something such as rope, wire,
or a structural beam to the point where it breaks.” Science Reference:
Tensile Strength, SCIENCE DAILY, http://www.sciencedaily.com/articles/
t/tensile_strength.htm (last visited May 11, 2013).

37.

Yu et al., supra note 7, at 637.

38.

ON
EMERGING
NANOTECHNOLOGIES
All
Products,
PROJECT
http://www.nanotechproject.org/inventories/consumer/browse/products/
(last visited May 11, 2013) (providing a list of consumer products
containing nanoscale materials).

39.

Consumer Safety Groups File First Lawsuit on Risks of Nanotechnology,
NANOTECHNOLOGY NOW, http://www.nanotech-now.com/news.cgi? story_id
=44147 (Dec. 21, 2011).

40.

John Timmer, US Public Fears a Bad Sunburn More than Nanotech, ARS
TECHNICA (Apr. 15, 2011, 12:39 PM), http://arstechnica.com/science/
2011/04/us-public-fears-a-bad-sunburn-more-than-nanotech.

41.

Id.
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While it is understandable that consumers expect commonly used
products to be safe for everyday use, the demand for complete safety
may be unreasonable. There are many common products that do not
utilize nanotechnology that will never be completely risk-free, including
cars, over-the-counter pain medications, and steak knives. There are
risks involved in the use of these products, but the benefits of proper use
outweigh those risks. The same may be true for nanotechnology.
Some nanotechnology products are less common or do not involve
regular consumer exposure. For example, nanomedicine is a quickly
growing field of study.42 Nanomedicine is the use of nanotechnology for
medical purposes, including the enhancement of pharmaceuticals and
medical devices.43 Studies have suggested that nanotechnology could play
an important role in treating cancer.44 There is no doubt that many
people would be in favor of technological advances that have the
potential to save lives or enhance quality of life. There may be less
concern over the potential risks of nanotechnology when those who are
in need of medical treatments are informed of the benefits.
B.

Nanotoxicology: The Toxic Effects of Nanotechnology

Nanotoxicology is an emerging area of study that explores the effects of
nanoparticles within the body.45 Nanoparticles can enter the human body
through several types of exposure, including ingestion, inhalation, injection,
and skin absorption.46 Exposure to nanotechnology occurs even without
technological advances because nanoparticles exist naturally in the
environment.47 While humans have always been exposed to nanoparticles,
42.

See
What
is
Nanomedicine,
NANOMEDICINE
CENTER,
http://www.nanomedicinecenter.com/what-is-nanomedicine (last visited
May 11, 2013).

43.

Id.

44.

Researchers Effectively Treat Tumors with Use of Nanotubes, WAKE
FOREST BAPTIST MEDICAL CENTER, http://www.wakehealth.edu/NewsReleases/2009/Researchers_Effectively_Treat_Tumors_with_Use_of_
Nanotubes.htm (last updated Aug. 13, 2009) [hereinafter WAKE FOREST];
Researchers Use Nanotubes to Treat Tumors, RADIOLOGY TODAY,
http://www.radiologytoday.net/news/082509_news.shtml (last visited May
16, 2013).

45.

See Günter Oberdörster et al., Nanotoxicology: An Emerging Discipline
Evolving from Studies of Ultrafine Particles, 113 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP.
823, 823 (2005); The Dose Makes the Poison, 6 NATURE NANOTECHNOLOGY
329, 329 (2011). Nanotoxicology involves researching the ways that
nanoscale particles can react differently within the body than particles of
the same material in a larger size. The toxicity of nanomaterials can be
“unexpected and unusual” and the interactions between nanoparticles can
be dynamic, making it very challenging to determine how nanoparticles
will react within the human body. Id.

46.

Oberdörster, supra note 45, at 823.

47.

Id.
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nanotoxicology is important now because human exposure has “increased
dramatically” due to the use of nanotechnology in a variety of
products.48 This has made it essential that researchers go beyond simply
studying the toxicology of nanoparticles within the body in general and
begin studying the toxicology of larger quantities of nanoparticles within
the body.
Research has shown that large-scale materials that are harmless can
become more toxic when they are manufactured down to the nanoscale.49
With relatively little knowledge of how nanoparticles will react within
the human body, it is difficult to determine when risks are posed to
human health or how severe those risks may be.50 As discussed below,
some studies have indicated that nanostructures called carbon nanotubes
may act similarly to asbestos within the body, which could lead to lifethreatening diseases like cancer.51 Due to our current knowledge of
asbestos toxicology, some scientists have chosen to focus on the toxicity
of long-term exposure to nanoparticles compared to the toxicity of shortterm exposure.52 To date, there have not been any reports of deaths from
short-term exposure to nanoparticles, but the story of asbestos began the
same way. It was only after long-term exposure that people started
getting sick and dying from asbestosis.53
One general concern is that nanoparticles tend to aggregate within
the body, creating an increased volume of nanoparticles with each
additional exposure.54 There also appears to be a “natural passageway”
for nanoparticles to delve into and around the body through the
membranes that separate bodily organs.55 This natural passageway gives
nanoparticles a high level of mobility within the body.56 Increased
mobility of nanoparticles within the body means that inhaled particles
will not be restricted to the lungs; similarly, ingested particles will not
be restricted to the gastrointestinal tract.57 While this should not be
48.

Id.

49.

Chan, supra note 9, at 220.

50.

See id. at 221.

51.

See infra Part I.C; Atsuya Takagi et al., Induction of Mesothelioma in
P53+/- Mouse by Intraperitoneal Application of Multi-walled Carbon
Nanotube, 33 J. TOXICOLOGICAL SCI. 105, 105–06 (2008).

52.

Chan, supra note 9, at 221.

53.

Id.; Asbestos Exposure and Cancer Risk, NAT’L CANCER INST.,
http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/factsheet/Risk/asbestos (last updated
May 1, 2009).

54.

Chan, supra note 9, at 221.

55.

Id.

56.

Id.

57.

See Wim H. De Jong & Paul J.A. Borm, Drug Delivery and Nanoparticles:
Applications and Hazards, 3 INT. J. NANOMEDICINE 133, 133 (2008); Chan,
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medically alarming in and of itself, it does hint at the potential for any
harm from nanoparticles to be widespread throughout the body.
Other concerns arise from findings that show that certain nanoparticles may be transmitted to a fetus through the mother’s placenta,
although it is unknown whether this could have a negative impact on fetal
development or the future health of the child.58 If exposure to
nanoparticles is ever confirmed to cause health risks in general, those risks
would be magnified by the fact that any pregnant woman exposed to
nanoparticles will be exposing her fetus as well. This could include
exposure that occurs during the pregnancy and exposure that occurred
before the pregnancy began, because nanoparticles can accumulate and
remain within the body long after exposure.59
C.

Studies Reporting the Specific Dangers of Nanotechnology

According to some commentators, the uncertainty of risks posed by
nanotechnology is particularly worrisome. While the actual risks of
nanotechnology may remain unknown, the many routes through which
nanoparticles may enter the body60 suggest that simply being near
nanoparticles puts people at risk of having nanoparticles enter their
body. This can vary based on the type of product to which one is being
exposed. For example, rubbing sunscreen on your skin will more likely
lead to absorption than simply touching a bicycle because sunscreen is
designed to be absorbed into the skin. Nanoparticles being injected as
medication or consumed as food will have a direct entrance into the
body. Because nanoparticles have many routes of exposure, scientists
must determine what effects those nanoparticles will have once inside

supra note 9, at 221. The ability of nanoparticles to travel easily through
barriers between organs introduces both a risk and a benefit. There may be
instances where nanoparticles can cause harm by being able to travel freely
throughout the body, but there may also be times when the ability of
nanoparticles to travel through organ barriers is a useful for drug delivery.
Id.
58.

Chan, supra note 9, at 221; Jeffrey A. Keelan, Nanoparticles Versus the
Placenta, 6 NATURE NANOTECHNOLOGY 263, 263 (2011) (noting that
damage to the placenta and fetus were caused by exposing mice to smaller
nanoparticles, while mice exposed to larger nanoparticles showed no signs
of damage to fetus or placenta); see generally Peter Wick et al., Barrier
Capacity of Human Placenta for Nanosized Materials, 118 ENVTL. HEALTH
PERSPS. 432 (2010) (detailing a study that showed testing on human
placentas showed nanoparticles were able to cross the placental barrier).

59.

Y. Song et al., Exposure to Nanoparticles is Related to Pleural Effusion,
Pulmonary Fibrosis and Granuloma, 34 EUR. RESPIRATORY J. 559, 559
(2009); see Poison, supra note 45, at 329.

60.

See Oberdörster et al., supra note 45, at 823.
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the body. Several studies on the effects of nanoparticles in the body have
been conducted, and the results have been mixed.61
One study, known as the Takagi study, suggests that carbon nanotubes present serious enough risks to be labeled “the next asbestos.”62
This label should not be taken lightly, as the long-term health effects of
asbestos became a major concern after years of acute asbestos exposure
led to mesothelioma in a large number of people.63 In the Takagi study,
mice exhibited symptoms similar to mesothelioma after being injected
with multi-walled carbon nanotubes (MWCNTs).64 The Takagi study
was later “criticized for the use of extremely high doses” of MWCNTs;65
another researcher indicated that the doses were “highly unrealistic.”66
A second study, known as the Poland study, was conducted to
further investigate the “asbestos-like pathogenicity” of MWCNTs.67 The
Poland study led to results similar to those in the Takagi study, including
the formation of granulomas and inflammation in mice, and the researchers concluded that the size and shape of the injected MWCNTs was a
factor that contributed to the negative health effects.68 While all
MWCNTs are nanoparticles, their exact size and shape can vary.69
61.

See id.; Takagi et al., supra note 51; Craig A. Poland et al., Carbon
Nanotubes Introduced into the Abdominal Cavity of Mice Show AsbestosLike Pathology in a Pilot Study, 3 NATURE NANOTECHNOLOGY 423, 423
(2008).

62.

See Takagi et al., supra note 51.

63.

Mesothelioma is a rare lung cancer that is caused by exposure to asbestos.
Asbestos fibers can lodge into a protective membrane around the lungs
called the mesothelial lining. Tumors can form where the asbestos fibers
have lodged in the mesothelial lining. Researchers have hypothesized how
this leads to cancer. One idea is that the asbestos fibers cause irritation to
the lining, which can then lead to “irreversible scarring, cellular damage
and cancer.” Another possibility is that the asbestos fibers interrupt
cellular division, causing genetic changes that lead to cancer. A final theory
is that the asbestos releases free radicals, which then damage the DNA and
cause healthy cells to become cancerous. Mesothelioma Causes,
MESOTHELIOMA CTR., http://www.asbestos.com/mesothelioma/causes.php
(last modified Feb. 18, 2013).

64.

Takagi et al., supra note 51, at 105. MWCNTs are a type of nanoparticle
that has been researched for use in medical devices, as well as for many
unrelated uses, but have been shown to possibly have negative health
effects similar to mesothelioma. See id.

65.

Gaku Ichihara et al., Letter to the Editor, 33 J. TOXICOLOGICAL SCI. 381,
381 (2008); Andrew D. Maynard et al., The New Toxicology of
Sophisticated Materials: Nanotoxicology and Beyond, 120(S1)
TOXICOLOGICAL SCI. S109, S116 (2010).

66.

Ichihara et al., supra note 65, at 381.

67.

Poland et al., supra note 61, at 423

68.

Id.

69.

Id.
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Researchers found that the longer, thinner MWCNTs caused more
granulomas and inflammation than the shorter, thicker ones.70 Although
researchers are not entirely sure why exposure to asbestos particles
causes lung cancer, most hypotheses indicate that it is the size and shape
of the asbestos particles, not the chemical make-up, that leads to lung
cancer after asbestos exposure.71 The Poland study has been criticized for
falsely concluding that the health effects caused by MWCNTs injected
into mice stomachs are an accurate representation of the health effects
that humans would experience after inhaling MWCNTs.72
In another study, done at Los Alamos National Laboratory (the Los
Alamos study), researchers studied fullerenes, also known as “buckyballs,” which are cage-like nanostructures made of carbon and shaped
like soccer balls.73 Researchers have suggested that buckyballs would
make excellent drug delivery devices.74 In the Los Alamos study,
researchers studied plain buckyballs, as well as two modified versions
known as “tris” and “hexa.”75 While the plain and hexa buckyballs
showed no damage to cells, the tris configuration had a toxic reaction
within human tissue.76 The researchers noted that the presence of these
buckyballs induced “cell cycle arrest and premature senescence in human
skin cells.” 77 In other words, the cells stopped growing, dividing, and
dying, as if their lifecycles simply ended.78 This study demonstrated

70.

Id.

71.

See MESOTHELIOMA CTR., supra note 63.

72.

John C. Monica, Jr. & John C. Monica, A Nano-Mesothelioma False
Alarm, 5 NANOTECHNOLOGY L. & BUS. 319, 319 (2008).

73.

Jun Gao et al., Fullerene Derivatives Induce Premature Senescence: A
New Toxicity Paradigm or Novel Biomedical Applications, 244
TOXICOLOGY & APPLIED PHARMACOLOGY 130, 130 (2010); Bahm, supra
note 6.

74.

Bahm, supra note 6; Researchers Create DNA Buckyballs for Drug
Delivery, PHYSORG (Aug. 29, 2005), http://www.physorg.com/
news6066.html; see Darshana Nagda et al., Bucky Balls: A Novel Drug
Delivery System, 2 J. CHEMICAL & PHARMACEUTICAL RES. 240, 243-44
(2010).

75.

Gao et al., supra note 73, at 131. “Tris” and “hexa” refer to the number of
branches that come off of the buckyball structure. A “plain” buckyball has
no branches, a tris buckyball has three branches, and a hexa buckyball has
six branches. The various configurations can lead to different uses for the
buckyballs, as well as different risks. Carbon Nanostructures, LOS ALAMOS
NATIONAL LIBRARY, http://tri-lab.lanl.gov/index.php/scientific-discovery/
62-carbon-nanostructures (last visited May 12, 2013).

76.

Gao et al., supra note 73, at 131.

77.

Id.

78.

Carbon Nanostructures: Elixir or Poison?, SCIENCE DAILY (Apr. 1, 2010),
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2010/03/100331151146.htm.
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that a tiny change in nanostructures can be the “difference between
treatment and toxicity.”79
The three studies above highlight the importance of assessing the
risks of nanotechnology and regulating those risks appropriately. If even
small changes in the nanostructure can be the difference between
something beneficial and something dangerous, regulators will want to
ensure that research is conducted to clarify exactly what risks are
present so they can regulate accordingly. There may also be a chance
that a nanomaterial deemed safe could accidentally be manufactured
incorrectly due to human error or another type of malfunction. For
example, if a buckyball structure is determined to be safe for use as a
drug delivery method, regulators should require that manufacturing of
that product follow strict inspection and quality guidelines to ensure
that only safe configurations of buckyballs are produced and marketed.
D.

The Benefits of Nanotechnology

Nanotechnology serves a variety of useful purposes. In some instances,
entirely new products have been created using nanotechnology. In other
cases, nanotechnology has improved products that already exist by
increasing their function, cost-effectiveness, or both.
While there are a wide variety of uses for nanotechnology, carbon
nanotubes in particular offer one of the most intriguing, and perhaps
desired uses: enhanced cancer treatments. A collaborative research study
by Wake Forest University School of Medicine, the Wake Forest
University Center for Nanotechnology and Molecular Materials, Rice
University, and Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
showed that when MWCNTs are inserted into tumors and then exposed
to laser-generated near-infrared radiation there is a high rate of tumor
elimination.80
During the study, researchers injected MWCNTs into kidney tumors
in mice. Some mice were injected with more MWCNTs than others, and
some were not injected at all.81 Some were exposed to the radiation and
some were not.82 Mice that received no treatment died within thirty days
of the beginning of the study.83 Mice that were injected with the
MWCNTs but not exposed to the radiation and mice that were exposed
to the radiation but not injected with the MWCNTs also died within
about thirty days.84 The mice that received the injections of MWCNTs
followed by thirty seconds of exposure to the radiation lived much longer
79.

Bahm, supra note 6.

80.

See WAKE FOREST, supra note 44; RADIOLOGY TODAY, supra note 44.

81.

WAKE FOREST, supra note 44.

82.

Id.

83.

Id.

84.

Id.
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than those that did not receive both treatments.85 The study also showed
that the mice that were given higher quantities of MWCNTs lived longer
than those that were given smaller quantities.86 This same study is now
being conducted with breast cancer cells in hopes that the results will be
similar.87 If nanotechnology can be used to enhance high-priority medical
treatments such as those for cancer, then advancement of that technology
is likely to be very desirable.
Nanotechnology offers benefits for the industrial and energy sectors.
Nanoscale coatings can be used for weatherproofing, increasing durability,
and cleaning.88 Nanotechnology can be used to enhance operations of our
current energy sources or to help the United States transition to “cleaner”
sources of energy.89 Nanoscale substances can be used to create coatings
that prevent corrosion and withstand high heat, enhancing the durability
of the infrastructure of nuclear power plants.90 Nanotechnology can also
be used in the production of photovoltaic cells used to harness solar
power and to improve turbines used to harness wind energy.91 In
addition to these large-scale benefits, nanotechnology can also be used to
enhance smaller-scale products like sunscreen and cosmetics in similar
ways.92

II. Balancing the Risks and Benefits
of Nanotechnology
As discussed above, while there are many potentially beneficial uses
for nanotechnology, these benefits are often associated with new risks.93
A principal consideration when regulating nanotechnology will be
balancing the benefits and risks.
Nanotechnology has emerged in the United States during a tumultuous political climate. The United States has recently faced a recession

85.

Id.

86.

Id.

87.

See Press Release, Wake Forest Baptist Med. Ctr, Nanotube Therapy
Takes Aim at Breast Cancer Stem Cells (Feb. 9, 2012), available at
http://www.wakehealth.edu/News-Releases/2012/Nanotube_Therapy_
Takes_Aim_at_Breast_Cancer_Stem_Cells.htm.

88.

NANOTECHNOLOGY NOW, supra note 1.

89.

The ‘Power’ of Nanotechnology, NANOTECHNOLOGY NOW (July 13, 2007),
http://www.nanotech-now.com/columns/?article=078.

90.

Id.

91.

Id.; Sandra Knisely, Carbon Nanotubes May Cheaply Harvest Sunlight,
PHYSORG (Oct. 19, 2009), http://www.physorg.com/news175182633.html.

92.

NANOTECHNOLOGY NOW, supra note 1.

93.

See supra Part I.
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from which it is still recovering.94 Because of the recession, the public has
placed pressure on the President and other politicians to avoid heavy
regulatory burdens on industrial manufacturers.95 Regulating nanotechnology too heavily may raise costs for consumers and inhibit
technological advances, while failing to regulate at all could put public
health at risk.
One avenue for regulating environmental health and safety (EHS)
risks associated with nanotechnology is the EPA’s Toxic Substances
Control Act (TSCA).96 TSCA is a “risk-benefit balancing statute” meant
to balance the risks posed by a chemical or substance being regulated
against the economic consequences of regulation.97 The EPA collects
information through TSCA about new substances to be manufactured,
and uses that information to decide when to intervene by limiting or
banning production.98 TSCA requires the EPA to make findings with
regard to the EHS of new products as well as the benefits of those
products, the availability of alternatives, and the “reasonably ascertainable economic consequences” of regulating those products.99 TSCA also
requires the EPA to regulate products as necessary to protect against
potential risks, but only by imposing the least burdensome requirements.100
A.

The Toxic Substances Control Act

TSCA is described as a “front-loaded” statute because it is meant to
assess the environmental risks associated with a material before
manufacturing and marketing occur.101 Through TSCA, the EPA
94.

See Chris Isidore, It’s Official: Recession Since Dec. ‘07, CNN MONEY,
http://money.cnn.com/2008/12/01/news/economy/recession/index.htm
(last updated Dec. 1, 2008, 5:40 PM EST).

95.

Bill Vlasic, U.S. Sets Higher Fuel Efficiency Standards, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
29, 2012, at B1; A Look Ahead to EPA Regulations for 2013: Numerous
Obama EPA Rules Placed On Hold Until After the Election Spell Doom for
Jobs and Economic Growth, CNS NEWS, http://cnsnews.com/sites/default/
files/ documents/A_Look_Ahead_to_ EPA_Regulations_for_2013.pdf;
see Larry Bell, EPA’s Insanely Ambitious Agenda if Obama is Reelected,
FORBES (Nov. 4, 2012, 12:18 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/larrybell/
2012/11/04/epas-insanely-ambitious-agenda-if-obama-is-reelected.

96.

J. CLARENCE DAVIES, MANAGING THE EFFECTS OF NANOTECHNOLOGY 10–12
(2006), available at http://www.nanotechproject.org/process/assets/files/
2708/30_pen2_mngeffects.pdf [hereinafter DAVIES 3].

97.

ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE,
AND POLICY 245–47 (6th ed. 2009).

98.

Id. at 247.

99.

Id.; Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. § 2605(c)(1) (2006).

100. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a).
101. NANOTECHNOLOGY: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, POLICY, AND BUSINESS
CONSIDERATIONS 13 (Lynn L. Bergeson ed., 2010) [hereinafter Bergeson].
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regulates substances in three categories: (1) new substances that are not
yet on the TSCA inventory, (2) substances that have already been
assessed and placed on the TSCA inventory based on their current use,
and (3) substances that are on the TSCA inventory but that are being
used in a new way that may change the associated risks.102 One
roadblock in regulating nanotechnology through TSCA is determining
how to categorize nanotech products. Classifying a nanotech material as
a new substance, a substance already on the TSCA inventory, or a new
use for a TSCA inventory substance will affect how rigorously it is
assessed before being approved for manufacturing.103 In many cases,
manufacturers may be confused as to what they need to file with the
EPA as they may be unsure of their product’s classification.
1.

The TSCA Process

Under TSCA Section 8, the EPA keeps an inventory of all existing
chemical substances that are manufactured or processed in the United
States.104 TSCA Section 6 gives the EPA authority to prohibit or limit
the manufacturing, processing or distribution of substances or mixtures
containing substances that are on the TSCA inventory.105 “New chemical
substances” are placed on the TSCA inventory through the premanufacture notice process.106 Manufacturers are required to submit
information to the EPA about new chemical substances at least ninety
days before production begins.107 The required documentation includes
basic chemical data as well as any available information regarding health
risks.108 The EPA uses the pre-manufacture notice to determine whether
manufacturing of the substance should be allowed without restrictions,
allowed with some limitations, or banned altogether.109 A decision to
limit or ban production will be based on whether there is a reasonable
basis to conclude that the manufacturing of that substance poses an
unreasonable risk to human health or the environment.110 Once a
substance is placed on the TSCA inventory, all subsequent manufactur-

102. 15 U.S.C. § 2604(a) (2006).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (2006).
106. Id. § 2604(a).
107. Id. § 2604(a)(1).
108. Id. § 2604(b)(2)(B)(i).
109. Id. § 2605(a).
110. Id.
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ers who plan to use that substance in the same way are bound by the
limitations set by the EPA.111
The EPA also has the authority to restrict or ban the manufacturing
of TSCA inventory substances that are being used in a way that is
considered a “significant new use.”112 Using the same pre-manufacture
notice process as it does for new chemical substances, the EPA requires
documentation from the manufacturer explaining the chemical, the
intended use of the chemical, and any known risks.113 If the EPA
determines that the product is going to be put to a “significant new
use,” it will set a significant new use rule (SNUR) for that substance.114
The SNUR sets out any limitations the EPA deems necessary for the
safe production of that substance for its new use. Anyone who intends to
manufacture it for purposes of that significant new use will be bound by
the SNUR promulgated by the EPA.115
2.

Limitations on TSCA Authority

While the basic TSCA framework appears to give the EPA authority
to decide which products should have limitations and which products
should be banned, this authority is not without limits.116 As shown
above, the EPA must balance the potential risks and benefits of a
product while also considering the availability of substitutes and the
economic consequences of regulating the product.117
In 1989, the EPA issued a final rule under TSCA prohibiting the
manufacture and use of asbestos.118 The EPA determined, after ten years
of research and consideration, that asbestos presented an unreasonable
risk to human health, and that the best way to reduce that risk was to
ban production of asbestos.119 The asbestos industry quickly challenged
this rule in Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA.120 In Corrosion, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals struck down the EPA’s ban as being too
burdensome for a product for which there were no substitutes presently
available and because the cost of banning asbestos would be excessive
111. New Chemical Consent Orders and Significant New Use Rules (SNURs),
EPA, http://www.epa.gov/oppt/newchems/pubs/cnosnurs.htm (last
updated Sept. 28, 2012).
112. 15 U.S.C. § 2604(a) (2006).
113. EPA, supra note 111.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 97, at 247–59.
117. Id. at 247.
118. 54 Fed. Reg. 29,460, 29,460 (July 12, 1989).
119. Id.
120. Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1207 (5th Cir. 1991).
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when compared to the number of lives that would be saved by the
ban.121 The Corrosion Court’s holding shows that the EPA’s authority to
limit or ban production of a material is not unlimited and that before
the EPA can ban production of a material it must provide substantial
evidence that the benefits of the regulation bear a reasonable relationship to the costs of the regulation.122
B.

A Square Peg in a Round Hole: Applying TSCA to Nanotechnology

The EPA may have authority to regulate nanotechnology through
TSCA, but that does not mean that TSCA is an adequate method for
protecting against EHS risks.123 Based on the processes and limitations of
TSCA, the EPA will face several challenges in attempting to regulate
nanotechnology.124 First, many nanomaterials are essentially smaller
versions of existing materials. When this occurs, the EPA must decide
whether to treat the nanoscale version the same as they treat the largescale version.125 The initial classification as new, existing, or a significant
new use will have a significant impact on whether the product will be
regulated at all.126
Second, as discussed above, there is still uncertainty as to what risks
are associated with nanotechnology.127 The TSCA process requires that
manufacturers supply the EPA with material risk information before
manufacturing begins, but TSCA does not require that the manufacturer
actually perform an in-depth risk assessment.128 Instead, manufacturers
are only required to submit the material and risk information that is
available to them, and the EPA may require testing if it finds that a
material may pose an unreasonable risk.129 There is no incentive for
manufacturers to engage in voluntary, in-depth risk assessment because
a lack of risk information is construed as a lack of risk.130 By providing
minimal risk information, a manufacturer can be in compliance with
TSCA while avoiding limitations on production that may have been
imposed if further risk information had been provided.131

121. Id. at 1229.
122. Id. at 1220.
123. See DAVIES 1, supra note 19, at 24.
124. Id. at 22–23; Bergeson, supra note 101, at 6-7.
125. See DAVIES 1, supra note 19, at 22–24; Bergeson, supra note 101, at 7.
126. See DAVIES 1, supra note 19, at 23.
127. See supra Parts I.B–C.
128. Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. § 2603 (2010).
129. Id. § 2603(a)(1)(A)(i).
130. DAVIES 3, supra note 96, at 11–12.
131. See id.
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Finally, once the EPA has weighed the risks and benefits of a nanotech substance, it must regulate using the least burdensome
requirements.132 As we have seen with asbestos, determining the least
burdensome requirements can be subjective, and if the EPA’s determination does not properly balance risks, benefits, and costs, then the
regulation may be overturned if challenged.133 It is unclear whether
TSCA intended the alternatives for limiting material production to be a
hierarchy, so without further guidance, the EPA may not have a clear
way of measuring whether one alternative is more burdensome than
another.134
1.

Classification Confusion and Proposed Alternatives

The EPA has already taken steps toward determining how it will
classify nanomaterials for purposes of TSCA.135 Because many of those
materials have a large-scale version already on the TSCA inventory, it is
difficult to determine whether those nanoscale substances should be
treated as new substances, substances already on the inventory, or
significant new uses of substances already on the inventory.136 In 2008,
the EPA released a document addressing the classification issue.137 In
this paper, the EPA stated that its expectation was that while some
nanoscale substances may qualify under TSCA as new chemical
substances, not all of them will, and that the EPA would have to follow
its historical approach of determining the “inventory status of chemical
substances” on a “case-by-case” basis.138
TSCA defines a “chemical substance” as “any organic or inorganic
substance of a particular molecular identity . . . .”139 The EPA defines
molecular identity as being “based on such structural and compositional
features as the types and number of atoms in the molecule, the types
and number of chemical bonds, the connectivity of atoms in the
molecule, and the spatial arrangement of atoms within the molecule.”140
When two substances have the same molecular identity, the EPA has
declined to use particle size to distinguish the substances for purposes of
132. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a).
133. See supra Part II.A.2.
134. See supra Part II.A.2.
135. Bergeson, supra note 101, at 7-9.
136. EPA, TSCA INVENTORY STATUS OF NANOSCALE SUBSTANCES – GENERAL
APPROACH 1-3 (2008), available at http://www.epa.gov/oppt/nano/nmspinventorypaper2008.pdf [hereinafter INVENTORY STATUS].
137. Id. at 1.
138. Id. at 2.
139. Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. § 2602(2)(A) (2010).
140. INVENTORY STATUS, supra note 136, at 3.
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the TSCA inventory.141 When both a nanoscale version and a large-scale
version of a substance exist, and both versions have matching molecular
identities, placing either on the TSCA inventory “will encompass both . .
. forms of the substance.”142 It follows that when a large-scale substance
is already on the TSCA inventory, any new nanoscale versions of that
substance will be considered an existing chemical.143
An alternative to this would be to consider a nanoscale version of a
large-scale substance to be a significant new use. If considered a
significant new use, the nanoscale version of the substance would require
a more rigorous assessment than an existing substance, similar to the
assessment required for a new substance.144 This would not overcome the
fact that new substance assessments may be insufficient, but it is an
alternative to considering the nanoscale substances to be existing
chemicals and to require no assessment at all.
The EPA has begun the regulatory process for some types of carbon
nanotubes.145 The EPA’s Inventory Status of Nanoscale Substances
emphasizes the approach the EPA has always used in classifying
substances under TSCA—focusing on the molecular identity of the
substances.146 The EPA makes a general statement that “a molecule is
the smallest unit of matter that retains all of its chemical properties.”147
This definition illustrates that the EPA’s historical methods for
determining whether a substance is a “new” or “existing” chemical
cannot be so easily applied to nanotechnology, for one of the main traits
of nanoscale substances is that they do not retain the chemical properties of their large-scale counterparts.148 The nanoscale version of a
substance is no longer the same molecule because it now has different
chemical properties than the large-scale version of the same substance
and thus may present different risks than the large-scale version.149
The EPA, however, does not consider the physical and chemical
properties when defining a substance as “new” or “existing.”150 The EPA
only considers molecular properties in determining whether two
141. Id. at 4.
142. Id. at 5.
143. See id. at 5; see also EPA, MEETING SUMMARY REPORT: MATERIAL
CHARACTERIZATION OF NANOSCALE MATERIALS (2007), available at
http://www.epa.gov/opptintr/nano/mc09072007-mtgsummary.pdf.
144. See INVENTORY STATUS, supra note 136, at 5–6.
145. 76 Fed. Reg. 26,192 (May 6, 2011).
146. INVENTORY STATUS, supra note 136, at 2–3.
147. Id. at 3.
148. See supra Part I.
149. See supra Part I.
150. INVENTORY STATUS, supra note 136, at 2–3.
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substances are the same.151 The EPA should consider the fact that two
substances may have the same molecular identity but different chemical
and physical properties, and those properties should lead to a more
stringent method for determining whether a nanoscale substance is the
“same” as the large-scale version.
The rationale behind more stringent testing for molecularly similar
but physically and chemically different substances applies equally to
evaluating locations on a simple road map. Two road maps from
different places can appear the same: the roads can have very similar
layouts and patterns making the two locations look identical. But if you
actually visited those two locations, they may not be identical at all; one
could be in a very hot climate with a flat surface, while the other could
be a cold, snowy climate with a mountainous surface. Looking at a road
map only gives you so much information about a location, and looking
at the molecular identity of a substance will also only give you so much
information about that substance. In either the chemical substance or
road map scenario proposed above, increased granularity is required to
perform a sufficient analysis.
2.

Lack of Risk Assessment and Uncertainty of Risks

The legislative intent behind TSCA is to balance the risks posed by
a product against the benefits and economic consequences of regulation,
but it may be difficult to find balance when the risks posed by a product
are unknown. It can be argued that the EPA has slowed the risk
assessment process by not requiring manufacturer testing of nanoscale
materials.152
TSCA Section 5 gives the EPA authority to require testing of new
chemicals or significant new uses of existing chemical substances when
there is believed to be an unreasonable risk.153 This authority, however,
does not mandate that the EPA must require testing, and it is no
surprise that this power is used very conservatively due to limited
resources and fear of political backlash.154 Imposing burdensome material
testing requirements could be viewed as being insensitive to those
affected by the weak economy and could hamper the development of
beneficial nanoscale products. If material testing was required before
151. Specifically, the EPA looks at whether two substances have (1) different
molecular formulas, (2) the same molecular formula but different atom
connectivities, (3) the same molecular formulas and atom connectivities
but different spatial arrangement of atoms, or (4) the same types of atoms
but different crystal lattices. The EPA also looks at whether the two
substances are different allotropes of the same element, or different isotopes
of the same element. Id. at 3–4.
152. See Wendy Wagner, When All Else Fails: Regulating Risky Products
Through Tort Litigation, 95 GEO. L.J. 693, 699 (2007).
153. 15 U.S.C. § 2603(a) (2011).
154. Wagner, supra note 152, at 699.
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nanotech products could be manufactured, there would be less incentive
for development of nanotech products, as the testing would be an added
cost to the manufacturers.
Manufacturers may also feel that there is an incentive not to generate risk assessment information.155 TSCA generally considers a lack of
information about a substance as indicating a lack of risk associated
with that substance.156 This gives manufacturers very little incentive to
conduct in-depth risk assessment research, because there is no sanction
for not undertaking that research and there may be penalties in the form
of heavier regulation if they do provide data.
3.

Applying the Least-Burdensome Regulations

The final issue in regulating nanotechnology through TSCA is the
requirement that the EPA utilize the least burdensome alternative when
applying regulations. Although TSCA gives the EPA comprehensive
authority over any chemical substance or mixture, it has been noted that
the “procedural and evidentiary demands of the statute sap it of much of
its effectiveness.”157 That was evident in Corrosion, in which the Fifth
Circuit demonstrated that what is “least burdensome” can be a very
subjective determination.158 The EPA had conducted ten years of
research compiled into a 45,000-page record before acting to ban
asbestos. The EPA felt its finding supported a regulation banning
asbestos, but the court found the EPA’s decision to be unduly burdensome.159
In Corrosion, the court found that by banning asbestos, the EPA
had utilized the “most burdensome” of the possible alternatives for
limiting production, stating that TSCA lists the seven alternatives in
order of how burdensome they are.160 However, while a complete ban on
a product can intuitively be labeled as “most burdensome,” the statute
does not explicitly state that the alternatives are listed in a hierarchy
from most burdensome to least.161 The Fifth Circuit determined that this
is meant to be a hierarchy, but the statute allows that the alternatives
can be used in combination, implying that no hierarchy was intended.162
This inconsistency can make it very difficult for the EPA to utilize the
least burdensome regulation, because other than banning production
155. See DAVIES 3, supra note 96, at 11–12.
156. Id.
157. PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 97, at 243.
158. Id. at 249.
159. Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1215–17 (5th Cir. 1991).
160. Id.
161. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (2006).
162. Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d at 1217.
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entirely, it is not clear which alternatives will be considered more
burdensome than others.
Overall, regulating nanotechnology through TSCA will be difficult,
at best. Some argue that TSCA is insufficient for regulating nanotechnology simply because it is a twentieth-century statute that was created
at a time when nanotechnology was not even a consideration.163
Classifying nanotech products through TSCA, balancing the risks and
benefits, and applying the least burdensome regulations may create
challenges for the EPA that will be difficult to overcome.

III. Regulating Nanotechnology
While the EPA and other regulatory agencies are under pressure to
reduce EHS risks as human exposure to nanotechnology increases, there
is also pressure to avoid over-regulating industries and companies that
are creating new, useful technology and keeping the United States at the
forefront of technological development. This is especially true at a time
when the economy is unstable and regulatory burdens could be too
costly for manufacturers to bear.
What is needed most at this point is balance. While TSCA was
enacted to achieve balance, for the reasons stated above, it may not be
sufficient for managing modern technologies with widespread applications, like nanotechnology.164 The need for a more comprehensive
nanotech oversight than TSCA can provide may be an opportunity to
explore broader reform for the federal agencies that are already
“suffer[ing] from under-funding and bureaucratic ossification” while
trying to apply twentieth-century regulations to twenty-first-century
technologies.165 Applying minor rule changes and increasing budgets to
implementing current statutes are not adequate measures for dealing
with new technologies.166 Instead, we should focus on new organizational
forms within federal agencies.167
There have been many suggestions for new laws and new organizational forms for regulating nanotechnology. In this Section, I will explore
three of those possibilities. One suggestion is to avoid federal regulations
entirely and allow the nanotech industry to self-regulate.168 Selfregulation of nanotechnology would utilize the knowledge and experience
163. See DAVIES 2, supra note 27, at 23-24.
164. See supra Part II.B.
165. DAVIES 2, supra note 27, at 3.
166. See id. at 24.
167. Id.
168. Diana M. Bowman & George Gilligan, The Private Dimension in the
Regulation of Nanotechnologies: Developments in the Industrial Chemicals
Sector, 28 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 77, 77 (2010).
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of experts within the industry, who would be responsible for creating a
set of guidelines or a code of conduct for industry participants to adhere
to.169 Another recommendation is to create a new federal agency that
would manage the EHS risks associated with chemicals or substances as
well as the risks associated with products.170 This recommendation would
apply to nanotechnology as well as other modern technologies.171 A third
option would be to combine the efficiency of self-regulation with the
oversight of a federal agency to create a form of co-regulation for
addressing nanotechnology risks.172 This could be accomplished by
expanding key agencies to include “Nanotech Divisions” that would
employ various processes to ensure a balanced approach to risk
assessment and management.173
A.

Self-Regulation

Self-regulation is not meant to exempt industry from complying with
federal laws and regulations. It is meant to allow nongovernmental
entities to independently create their own rules, codes of conduct and
enforcement measures to implement existing government rules and
regulations.174 Self-regulation can occur at an individual level, where an
entity would regulate itself, or a group level, where an industry or
association would set rules and standards to be followed by all entities
within that industry or association.175
The idea that governments should not monopolize regulation has
been explored through discussions of decentering regulation.176 The
concept of decentering regulation posits that industries, organizations,
and associations can and should have the power to regulate internally
and that the role of government regulation should be limited as much as
possible.177 This suggests that there should be a shift away from total
government regulation by allowing self-regulation because this would
allow for greater flexibility in product development and less regulatory
burden on smaller developers and manufacturers of certain products.178
169. Id. at 85–86.
170. See DAVIES 2, supra note 27, at 24.
171. Id.
172. See infra Part III.C.
173. See infra Part III.C.
174. Bowman & Gilligan, supra note 168, at 86.
175. Neil Gunningham & Joseph Rees, Industry Self-Regulation: An Institutional
Perspective, 19 LAW & POL’Y 363, 364 (1997).
176. Julia Black, Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation
and Self-Regulation in a ‘Post-Regulatory World’, CURRENT LEGAL
PROBLEMS: VOLUME 54 103, 103 (2001).
177. Id.
178. Id.

559

Health Matrix·Volume 23·Issue 2·2013
Nanotechnology

There are several potential benefits to self-regulation. It makes sense
to allow industry practitioners and experts to be involved in the
regulation process. Those experts can make decisions efficiently without
the constraints of federal agency decision-making processes.179 Selfregulation would also allow industries to bypass the legislative process in
developing rules and procedures to ensure compliance with existing
government regulations.
When an industry or association is self-regulated by those who are
familiar with the intricacies of the industry, there is a higher level of
expertise not often found among legislators.180 Because self-regulation has
flexibility, efficiency, and expertise, it promotes a regulatory atmosphere
where a manufacturer will feel it is being governed by a code that
applies to it directly—one that will conform to the manufacturers’
changing needs, rather than a broad, general standard to which
manufacturer must conform.181
B.

Federal Agency Regulation

As discussed above, current federal statutes like TSCA are a poor fit
for nanotechnology.182 It is difficult to determine whether a nanoscale
version of a material would be considered a “new” or “existing” material
when the large-scale version is already on the TSCA inventory.183 We
have already seen that a nanoscale version of a substance can be
significantly different from the large-scale version, but through TSCA,
these markedly different substances will be treated as if they are the
same.184 It is also difficult to balance the risks and benefits of nanotechnology through TSCA, as nanotechnology is a widespread field with
many applications. With these difficulties, the EPA may struggle to
determine the least burdensome way to regulate nanotechnology.185
Overall, TSCA creates a disincentive for manufacturers to generate or
provide risk information for their chemicals and products because it is
assumed that if there is no risk information, there is no risk.186
One commentator, J.C. Davies, has suggested that TSCA is simply
too outdated and too weak for regulating nanotechnology and that
merely making adjustments within TSCA will not fix these deficien179. Gunningham & Rees, supra note 175, at 366; Robert Heidt, Industry SelfRegulation and the Useless Concept “Group Boycott”, 39 VAND. L. REV.
1507, 1563 (1986).
180. Heidt, supra note 179, at 1562.
181. Id. at 1561–62.
182. See supra Part II.B.
183. See supra Part II.B.1
184. See supra Part II.B.1
185. See Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1229 (5th Cir. 1991).
186. DAVIES 3, supra note 96, at 11–12.
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cies.187 Davies is a senior project advisor to the Project on Emerging
Nanotechnologies and one of the co-authors of the plan that created the
EPA in the 1970’s.188 Davies recommends addressing nanotechnology by
creating a new federal agency—the Department of Environmental and
Consumer Protection (DECP).189 The DECP would be tasked with more
than just regulating nanotechnology and would be useful in addressing
the challenges posed by twenty-first-century technological advances in
general.190
This plan would work to address many issues that arise as we try to
regulate modern technology through the existing agencies and regulations created to protect public health. The idea of integrating and
restructuring the existing agencies to create an entirely new administrative framework is daunting, but we are at a time in technological
development where it will become increasingly difficult to fix the
shortcomings of the current regulatory scheme.191
Even if the proposed DECP seems extreme during this time of economic strain, its merits are worth exploring. Davies’ proposal addresses
many of the weaknesses in trying to apply the current environmental
regulatory system to modern technology. For effective oversight, Davies
argues that new concepts, types of organizations, and tools will be
necessary.192 The large-scale environmental problems created by
nanotechnology (and other modern technologies) are not compatible
with the current “fragmented system” of oversight.193 This fragmented
system is made up of legislation including the Clean Air Act, the Clean
Water Act, and various waste disposal programs. Each program works
individually, which is an inefficient way to manage areas of environmental concern because the seemingly different areas of the environment are
all in reality interconnected.194 In many cases, and especially when it
comes to nanotechnology, regulating the risks associated with different
products would benefit from combined risk research and monitoring.195
Creating the DECP would provide much-needed flexibility to the
organizations responsible for regulating nanotechnology.196 It would not

187. DAVIES 2, supra note 27, at 23–25.
188. Id. at 2.
189. Id. at 3.
190. Id. at 24.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 25.
195. Id.
196. Id.
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eliminate and replace but would incorporate existing agencies.197 The
agencies to be incorporated would include: (1) the EPA; (2) the US
Geological Survey; (3) the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; (4) the Occupational Safety and Health Administration; (5)
the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health; and (6) the
Consumer Products Safety Commission.198 Through oversight, research,
and monitoring, the proposed agency could also be used to address other
complicated environmental issues, like climate change.199 Incorporating
the six agencies into the DECP would allow for a greater influence on
policy and sufficient resources to address the new and ever-changing
issues that accompany modern technology.200
C.

Co-Regulation201

The benefits of self-regulation are appealing in a new, specialized
field like nanotechnology because it allows those who are most familiar
with the intricacies of the field to develop rules in a flexible and efficient
manner. But even with these benefits, self-regulation is not the best
route for managing the EHS risks of nanotechnology. There has been a
certain level of discomfort expressed by the public and activist groups,
who tend to believe that allowing industries and companies to selfregulate is akin to allowing those entities to not be regulated at all, and
that self-regulation of nanotechnology will not sufficiently protect public
health or the environment.202 Additionally, the idea of self-regulation
does not quite fit because nanotechnology is not an industry, but rather
a technology that has infiltrated a variety of industries.203 Self-regulation
is propelled by the idea of an industry banding together with a common
goal to promote product stewardship, but coordinating all of the
nanotech industries would prove to be more difficult and there would be
too many variances in values and industry norms for self-regulation to be
effective.
Self-regulation has been put to use in the past through the chemical
industry’s Responsible Care Program (RCP).204 Created in Canada in
1985, the RCP was adopted in the United States in 1989 to help increase
197. Id. at 26.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. See id.
201. Also known as audited regulation or mandated, sanctioned or coerced selfregulation. Id.
202. Id.
203. DAVIES 1, supra note 19, at 29–30.
204. Andrew A. King & Michael J. Lenox, Industry Self-Regulation Without
Sanctions: The Chemical Industry’s Responsible Care Program, 43 ACAD.
MGMT. J. 698, 698-99 (2000).
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the public’s confidence in chemical companies, and it is now part of a
global initiative to improve environmental and health performance
within the chemical industry.205 The main focus of the RCP is to
enhance product stewardship by improving risk communication through
the supply chain.206 More than fifty national chemical management
associations participate in the program, which is managed globally by
the International Council of Chemical Associations (ICCA).207 National
chemical associations commit to the program through an application
process administered by the ICCA.208 Once a national chemical association is part of the program, chemical companies within that nation may
voluntarily enroll in the RCP, which is then implemented by the
national chemical association in accordance with the goals and mission of
the ICCA.209
There has been some debate over whether self-regulation is a sufficient means to achieve environmental and public health goals in the
absence of heavy government regulation.210 Some argue that without
explicit sanctions in place to prevent opportunistic behavior, selfregulation will not succeed.211 Others argue that explicit sanctions are
not necessary for successful self-regulation because industry behavior will
be controlled “through informal means of coercion, the transferal of
norms, and the diffusion of best practices.”212 The RCP is an example of
self-regulation that is not implemented through explicit sanctions.213
Another argument against self-regulation is that it seems to serve
the industry being regulated instead of the public interest.214 This has
been viewed as “an attempt to deceive the public into believing in the
responsibility of a[n] irresponsible industry” or “a strategy to give the
government an excuse for not doing its job.”215 In 2005, two nongovernmental entities, DuPont Chemical Company and Environmental
205. Responsible Care, INT’L COUNCIL OF CHEM. ASS’NS, http://www.iccachem.org/en/Home/Responsible-care (last visited May 17, 2013).
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. FAQS, INT’L COUNCIL OF CHEM. ASS’NS, http://www.icca-chem.org/en/
Home/Responsible-care/FAQs (last visited May 17, 2013).
209. Id.
210. See King & Lenox, supra note 204, at 698.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 700.
214. Gunningham & Rees, supra note 175, at 366.
215. Id. at 370 (quoting John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation for Australia,
in BUSINESS REGULATION AND AUSTRALIA’S FUTURE 81, 93 (Grabosky &
Braithwaite eds., 1993).
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Defense, joined together to create the Nano Risk Framework, a
voluntary risk assessment framework for nanotechnology.216 This attempt
at jump-starting self-regulation was rejected by several activist groups
who claimed that “[t]he history of other voluntary regulation proposals is
bleak; voluntary regulations have often been used to delay or weaken
rigorous regulation and should be seen as a tactic to delay needed
regulation and forestall public involvement.”217
Self-regulation may also be burdensome on the nanotech industry
financially. Some would argue that self-regulation places minimal
financial burden on industry, but without government oversight there
will be no government funding to support the necessary research and risk
assessments or the implementation and auditing of the rules that result
from those assessments. This could place an especially heavy burden on
the smaller sectors of the nanotech industry that may not have the
resources to perform testing.
Federal agency regulation of nanotechnology has proven to be a
complicated matter up to this point. Initial attempts to regulate
nanotechnology through TSCA have been sloppy and difficult,218 and
past attempts by the EPA to regulate other potentially unsafe materials
through TSCA have been rejected, even with large amounts of research
supporting the EPA’s position.219
Davies’ idea of integrating federal agencies to create the DECP is
intriguing, but may not be feasible. It is important not to hinder
industry and new technology development with heavy regulatory
burdens during a turbulent political climate and a struggling economy.
Creating a new agency would be a large regulatory undertaking, and this
could be viewed as a step towards heavier regulatory burdens on
industry at a time when industry is already burdened by many other
financial difficulties.
When it comes to nanotechnology, the number of industry experts is
increasing every day, but the federal agencies are failing to keep up with
the expanding field. With the current statutes in place, the EPA is not
equipped to assess and manage the EHS risks of nanotechnology. Trying
to regulate nanotechnology through TSCA is like trying to fit a square
peg into a round hole—it just won’t work.220
Co-regulation through the creation of new, interconnected divisions
within key agencies will overcome the weaknesses of self-regulation and
the difficulties of government regulation through TSCA or the creation
216. Activist Groups Reject DuPont-ED Nanotechnology Risk Framework, NANOWERK
(Apr. 12, 2007), http://www.nanowerk.com/news/newsid=1766.php.
217. Id.
218. See supra Part II.B.
219. Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1207 (5th Cir. 1991).
220. See supra Part II.B.

564

Health Matrix·Volume 23·Issue 2·2013
Nanotechnology

of the DECP. This co-regulation program would incorporate the
expertise and flexibility of self-regulation with the oversight of a federal
agency. I am proposing that each federal agency that will address
nanotechnology be expanded to include a “Nanotech Division” (ND).
The NDs would work through a five-step process. First, the NDs will
be created to employ industry and agency nanotech experts. Second, the
NDs would begin gathering information from nanotech industry
participants through a mandatory program. Third, the NDs would
conduct thorough quantitative risk assessments based on the information
gathered from industry participants. Fourth, the NDs would establish
guidance documents or recommend regulations where necessary to
address EHS risks. Finally, the NDs will be expanded or minimized as
deemed necessary by the outcomes of the continuing risk research.
The final intensity of governmental regulatory authority over a
nanotech product or nanosubstance will be dependent on the outcome of
the risk assessments, with heavier government authority for a higher
level of proven risk and lighter government authority for a lower level of
proven risk. The complexity of heavier government authority will be
justified if there is a high level of proven risk. Inversely, a low level of
proven risk will show little need for government oversight and lighter
government authority will be appropriate.
1.

Step One: Creating Nanotech Divisions

The agencies that would expand or reorganize to include NDs would
be the same agencies that Davies recommends for incorporation into the
DECP: (1) the EPA; (2) the US Geological Survey; (3) the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; (4) the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration; (5) the National Institute of Occupational
Safety and Health; and (6) the Consumer Products Safety Commission.221 Throughout the five-step process, each ND would work with its
parent agency to address the specific concerns of that agency and would
also work cooperatively with other NDs as many of the potential risks
and applicable assessments will overlap.
One initial concern will be the lack of government employees who
are nanotech experts. In general, nanotechnology experts will earn more
money working in the private sector than they would as a government
employee. Budgeting is always an issue, and there simply may not be
resources to pay more to employ experts within the existing agencies.
This is one of the main justifications for utilizing co-regulation—
government employees are not expected to have this type of expertise
when it comes to nanotechnology. Instead of hiring nanotechnology
experts as agency employees, each agency could set aside a portion of its
budget to use towards working with industry experts on a contract basis,
either to provide the agency with information as needed or to give the
221. DAVIES 2, supra note 27, at 26.
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agency’s ND employees training to help build their expertise in
nanotechnology.
2.

Step Two: Manufacturer Information Production

Once the NDs are created, they will begin gathering material information. The information-gathering process would follow the structure of
a program implemented several years ago, but with some key changes. In
2005, the EPA National Pollution Prevention and Toxics Advisory
Committee (NPPTAC) set forth a framework for a Nanoscale Materials
Voluntary Program, which would later be called the Nanoscale Materials
Stewardship Program (NMSP).222 This framework included suggestions
for a “basic” program and an “in-depth” program.223 The basic program
applies to Step Two of my recommendation, while the in-depth program
would apply to Step Three. The basic program involved three activities
for each nanoscale material:
1) Reporting existing . . . material characterization information on
the material in commerce and materials soon to enter commerce,
as well as existing information characterizing hazard, use and
exposure potential, and risk management practices; 2) Filling in
gaps in basic information about material characteristics ONLY;
and 3) Implementing basic risk management practices.224

The EPA created the basic program in hopes of having a broad range of
organizations participate in providing relevant information on material
characterization, hazard information, use and exposure potential, and
risk management practices.225 As part of the program, the organizations
would also agree to implement environmental and occupational safety
controls such as hazard communication, worker training, and waste
management practices.226
The basic flaw of the NMSP was that the voluntariness of the
program invited low levels of participation. Between the start of the
NMSP and the final information submission date on July 28, 2008,
sixteen companies and trade associations voluntarily submitted

222. INTERIM AD HOC WORK GROUP ON NANOSCALE MATERIALS, EPA, OVERVIEW
OF ISSUES FOR PUBLIC DISCUSSION AND CONSIDERATION BY NPPTAC 1 (2005),
available at http://www.epa.gov/oppt/npptac/pubs/ nanowgoverviewdraft
050921finalv2.pdf [hereinafter NNPTAC]; see generally Concept Paper for
the Nanoscale Materials Stewardship Program Under TSCA, EPA (Jan. 21,
2010), http://www.epa.gov/oppt/nano/nmsp-conceptpaper.pdf.
223. NPPTAC, supra note 222, at 4.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 5.
226. Id.
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information on ninety-one nanoscale materials for the basic program.227
The information gathered through the basic program included very basic
chemical and manufacturing information, but very few submissions
actually included toxicity information as the submitters considered this
information to be confidential business information.228 The EPA stated
that “approximately 90% of the different nanoscale materials that are
likely to be commercially available were not reported under the Basic
Program,”229 so the information gathered during the basic program
represents a small fraction of nanotechnology.
A way to overcome this flaw as the NDs make another attempt to
gather information from manufacturers would be to utilize different
methods to encourage participation. One method could be requiring
mandatory participation. Participation could be required without placing
a heavy burden on manufacturers because Step Two of the program
would simply be gathering the information manufacturers already have
on hand, even if this information is minimal. The information gathered
would be protected as confidential business information and would be
used generally to assess EHS risks. Manufacturers that fail to participate
in a mandatory disclosure of information could be fined to help fund the
other ND program steps.
If mandatory participation would be considered too burdensome, the
ND could still encourage voluntary participation using economic tools.
For example, if a manufacturer willingly provides product information
for this step, that manufacturer would benefit from not having to test
those materials because the ND would perform testing during Step Three
risk assessment. Manufacturers that do not willingly provide their basic
product information during Step Two could be required to perform the
risk assessments from Step Three at their own expense.
3.

Step Three: Quantitative Risk Assessments

Step Three would involve quantitative risk assessments similar to
those from the in-depth program of the NMSP. The in-depth program
was designed to go beyond the basic program by taking the information
provided through the basic program and generating new, in-depth
information about the nanotech materials.230 The in-depth information

227. OFFICE OF POLLUTION PREVENTION & TOXICS, EPA, NANOSCALE
MATERIALS STEWARDSHIP PROGRAM INTERIM REPORT 3 (2009), available at
http://www.epa.gov/oppt/nano/nmsp-interim-report-final.pdf.
228. Id. at 9. Confidential business information may be submitted through the
NMSP, but this information is protected under 15 U.S.C. Section 2613 and
40 CFR Parts 2 and 720 and is therefore not subject to public disclosure.
Id.
229. Id. at 27.
230. NPPTAC, supra note 222, at 6.
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would be obtained through monitoring workplaces, environmental
releases and worker health, and quantitative risk assessments.231
For a more thorough assessment than was provided by the NMSP,
the NDs quantitative risk assessments would be accomplished through
the US government’s National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI). The
NNI was launched as a collaborative agency effort in 2001.232 The goals
of the NNI are (1) “[t]o advance world-class nanotechnology research
and development”; (2) “[t]o foster the transfer of new technologies into
products for commercial and public benefit”; (3) “[t]o develop and
sustain educational resources, a skilled workforce and the supporting
infrastructure and tools to advance nanotechnology”; and (4) “[t]o
support the responsible development of nanotechnology.”233 While
researching EHS risks associated with nanotechnology is an essential
step towards achieving each of these goals, it is most closely related to
the goal of “responsible development.”234
The NNI was created to allow all of the agencies that may be
involved with nanotechnology to work together with the nanotech
industry to conduct research in the field, but the NNI is a general research
initiative that focuses more on development of nanotech products than
researching nanotech risks. There is some federal funding for NNI through
the 21st Century Nanotechnology Research and Development Act of 2003
(NRD Act),235 but only 3 to 4 percent of federal NNI funding is used

231. Id.
232. NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL COMM. ON TECH. SUBCOMM. ON NANOSCALE
SCI., ENG’G, & TECH., NAT’L NANOTECH. INITIATIVE, STRATEGIC PLAN 1
(2011), available at http://nano.gov/sites/default/files/pub_resource/
2011_strategic_plan.pdf.
233. NNI Vision, Goals, and Objectives, NAT’L NANOTECHNOLOGY INITIATIVE,
http://www.nano.gov/about-nni/what/vision-goals (last visited May 13,
2013).
234. NATIONAL NANOTECHNOLOGY INITIATIVE, 2011 ENVIRONMENTAL, HEALTH, &
SAFETY STRATEGY 1 (2010), available at http://www.nano.gov/sites/
default/files/pub_resource/draftehsstrategy-17dec2010-to_post.pdf
[hereinafter STRATEGY].
235. 21st Century Nanotechnology Research and Development Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 7501 (2005).

568

Health Matrix·Volume 23·Issue 2·2013
Nanotechnology

towards risk assessment research.236 Additional risk assessment funding
comes from the federal agencies themselves.237
The risk assessment process outlined by the NNI follows a basic
scientific procedure that includes identifying hazards, assessing magnitude of exposure, assessing dose-response relationships, and
characterizing risks.238 This process is generally accepted within the
scientific and regulatory communities because it creates perspective
between toxicity, hazards, and risks associated with a material.239
4.

Step Four: Developing Guidance and Regulations

Step Four of my recommendation is for the NDs to use the gathered
risk information to develop industry guidance documents or to recommend new regulations as necessary. This is a step that will occur at
regular intervals simultaneously with the other steps. The information
gathered in Step Two and the research conducted in Step Three will give
some indication as to the EHS risks presented by nanotechnology.
Minimal or uncertain risks can be addressed through guidance documents, while serious risks can be addressed through regulations.
Industry guidance for nanotechnology has been difficult to establish.
One reason for this is the fact that there is still so much uncertainty as
to the EHS risks of nanotechnology. Because the risks are uncertain, it is
difficult to guide industry on avoiding those risks, but there should still
be some form of guidance, even if minimal at first, to assist manufacturers of nanoproducts in making decisions about how to handle those
products. For example, the National Institute for Occupational Safety
and Health has created a guidance document called Approaches to Safe
Nanotechnology to assist manufacturers in implementing occupational
safety measures to help reduce worker exposure to nanoparticles.240 The
236. National Nanotechnology Initiative Needs Fundamental Restructuring to
Effectively Address Nano Risks: Conflict Between Promotion, Oversight
Roles Impedes Balanced Approach, ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND (Oct.
31, 2007), http://www.edf.org/news/national-nanotechnology-initiativeneeds-fundamental-restructuring-effectively-address-nano-ris. Even the
3–4 percent figure is questioned because an unknown amount of funds are
used towards researching the development of nanotech products “where it
deems the research to be ‘relevant’ to answer risk questions.” Id.
237. NNI Budget, NAT’L NANOTECHNOLOGY INITIATIVE, http://nano.gov/aboutnni/what/funding (last visited May 15, 2013).
238. STRATEGY, supra note 234, at 2.
239. MARY K. THEODORE & LOUIS THEODORE,
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT 407 (2010).
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240. See generally NAT’L INST. FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH, CTRS.
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, NIOSH 2009-125, APPROACHES TO
SAFE NANOTECHNOLOGY: MANAGING THE HEALTH AND SAFETY CONCERNS
ASSOCIATED WITH ENGINEERED NANOMATERIALS (2009), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/docs/2009-125/pdfs/2009-125.pdf.
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occupational health and safety risks associated with nanotechnology are
also uncertain at this time, but this guidance was created to address the
potential concerns as a safeguard while thorough risk assessments are
being performed.241 Similar guidance could be created to address the
potential risks.
The NNI Environmental, Health, and Safety Research Strategy was
developed as guidance for agencies associated with nanomaterials to
assist those agencies in understanding their responsibilities, to identify
opportunities for agency collaboration, and to assist the NNI in
achieving federal goals for nanotech health and safety.242 This could be a
good starting point for creating industry guidance through the NDs.
Regulations can be used to address significant risks. It is difficult to
predict how the regulation process will occur because it is currently
uncertain whether there are significant risks and what those risks may
be. Once the risks are certain, each federal agency can determine
whether those risks can be addressed through current regulations or
whether new regulations need to be enacted. Creating new regulations is
not a simple process, and that is why this option would be reserved for
addressing known substantial risks discovered after the thorough risk
assessment process of Step Four. Should this be necessary, the coregulation would lean a bit more heavily towards government regulation.
5.

Step Five: Adjusting Nanotech Divisions to Address Actual Risks

Step Five cannot be outlined in detail until the EHS risk research
outcomes are determined. The purpose of this five-step process is to
allow the regulation of nanotechnology to conform to the level of certain
risk. The NDs will be created to address unknown risks and to promote
researching those potential risks. As the research continues, there may
be several potential outcomes. Nanotechnology may not present any
EHS risks and may be deemed categorically safe. On the other hand,
nanotechnology may be found to present a wide variety of serious risks
and may be deemed categorically unsafe. A third (and likely) outcome
falls between these two extremes—there may be some products and uses
for nanotechnology that pose severe EHS risks while other products and
uses pose no risks at all.243 Whichever of these three outcomes occurs will
determine whether the final regulatory structure will lean more towards
self-regulation, government regulation, or a balanced co-regulation.
If nanotechnology is found to be categorically safe, the NDs can be
reduced to smaller groups that can be used to continue testing and
analyzing new products as they are created. The smaller NDs will have
experience in analyzing the safety of nanotech products at that point
and should be able to continue monitoring new products in an efficient
241. See id. at v–vi.
242. STRATEGY, supra note 234, at 1–2.
243. DAVIES 1, supra note 19, at 20.
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yet thorough manner to ensure that the continued manipulation of
nanoparticles does not create EHS risks in the future.
If nanotechnology is found to be categorically unsafe, the NDs may
be used to create and enforce new federal regulations. The complex and
lengthy process of creating new regulations would be appropriate at that
point because there would be a need to protect the environment and the
public from the proven risks associated with nanotechnology. The need
for heavier government regulations may motivate certain manufacturers
to abandon the risky nanotech products and either go back to using
other existing products or develop a new, safer alternative to nanotechnology.
The most likely outcome from Steps One through Four is that nanotechnology will include a combination of products that create a very low
level of risk, products that create a high level of risk, and some products
that fall in between. Nanotechnology involves the manipulation of nature
to such a degree that it is a logical assumption that there will be some
risks. With this mixed outcome, the NDs can be adjusted within each
agency to account for different regulatory needs.
For example, there may be a higher level of risk for employees who
work directly with nanoparticles on a daily basis. These employees may
have a higher likelihood of exposure to free nanoparticles in the air and
on surfaces around them. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration could expand the role of its ND as necessary to account for the
higher level of risk associated with worker exposure. At the same time,
the EPA may find that there is actually very little risk associated with
disposal of products that contain fixed nanoparticles—like sheets of
metal with nanoscale components. With little risk at the time of
disposal, the EPA’s ND could minimize its focus on waste products
containing nanoparticles and expand its efforts towards other areas
where the level of risk is higher. This flexibility would allow each
agency’s ND to focus on the areas of higher risk with greater regulation
and oversight. The nanotech industry would benefit by not having to
face the burden of complying with regulations imposed on products that
pose no risk, and the federal agencies would benefit by being able to
focus efforts solely on areas of concern.
Overall, the Nanotech Divisions I am recommending will address
some of the concerns presented by other nanotech programs by creating
a flexible Five-Step program that can be adjusted based on the outcomes
of ongoing EHS risk assessments. The program will be strict because it
will include mandatory components requiring contributions from
industry and mandatory guidance or regulations where necessary, but it
will also be flexible by avoiding excessive regulation of unknown risks.
This program will combine elements of self-regulation with a new federal
agency structure that is able to address modern technologies.
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Conclusion
Any program used to regulate nanotechnology must balance its benefits and uncertain risks. The EPA has addressed new technologies and
unknown risks in the past but may not be equipped to address the
uncertainties posed by nanotechnology. Through a program that addresses
the gaps in current TSCA regulation and allows for utilization of industry
expertise, proper risk assessments can be conducted to ensure that
technological advances presented by nanotechnology are both beneficial
and safe. My recommendation for co-regulation through the creation of a
Nanotech Division within the EPA and other agencies addresses the
weaknesses associated with trying to regulate nanotechnology through
TSCA by incorporating components from existing programs, with some
adjustments, to create a more comprehensive program that is well-suited
for regulating nanotechnology. This co-regulation will address the current
unknown EHS risks of nanotechnology and will prepare the EPA and
other agencies for long-term regulation of nanotechnology once the EHS
risks have been established.
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